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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effect of personal relationships (called guanxi in China) and 
contractual governance on compliance with channel requirements and on market performance 
for both vegetable farmers and processing and exporting firms in China. A survey of 167 
farmers and 84 firms in Jiangsu Province, P.R. China provides the data for empirical study 
based on a structural model. The results demonstrate that guanxi networks in China 
significantly improve small-scale farmers’ compliance with buyers’ delivery requirements 
based on formal contracts, which eventually improve farmers’ market performance. Vegetable 
firms, on the other hand, place more emphasis on formal contracts in order to improve 
suppliers’ compliance with delivery requirements and thereby improve their own profitability. 
The results reveal that personal relationships and contracts have different impacts on farmers 
and firms. 
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1. Introduction 
 
China supplies more than one-third of world’s vegetables, which makes it the biggest 
vegetable producer in the world today (FAO, 2004). China’s vegetable sector, however, faces 
several challenges in the rapidly developing national and international markets with their high 
quality and safety requirements (Liu et al., 2004). While the rapid increase in production scale 
has led to an over-supply of low-quality vegetables, vegetable quality and safety have become 
major constraints for the further development of the Chinese vegetable sector. Chinese 
vegetable producers (mainly small-scale farmers) have difficulties implementing advanced 
planting and management technology due to technical, managerial and financial constraints 
(Hu and Xia, 2007); therefore, they are not able to comply with buyers’ quality requirements.  
 
Vegetable production in China is characterised by its small-scale, low productivity and 
inconsistent supply. It is not well organised (Lu, 2007) and contract farming is not well 
developed. Most of the farmers deliver their products to traditional channels based on their 
own experience (Ruerd Ruben et al., 2007a). Vegetable transactions are mostly conducted in 
face-to-face negotiations and with cash payments. Collaboration between farmers and buyers 
in long-term business relationships is limited. Therefore, farmers are not able to enter high-
value market outlets, such as supermarkets and international markets. Vegetable firms (i.e. 
processing and exporting companies in this study) also face problems in acquiring high-
quality vegetables from the supplier market. Constructing effective and efficient vegetable 
supply chains in order to improve overall performance of the vegetable sector must therefore 
become a priority task for the Chinese government.  
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In the Chinese business environment (e.g. in vegetable supply chains), personal relationships, 
called guanxi 1 , provide a basis for communication and information sharing, trusted 
relationships and collaboration. Guanxi is a special type of relationship that bonds the 
exchange partners based on reciprocal obligations to obtain resources through continual 
cooperation and exchange of favours (Davies et al., 1995). Guanxi is transferable from one 
person to another; both direct and indirect personal connections weave multilayer guanxi 
networks. Guanxi is the lifeblood of the Chinese business community and extends into society 
and politics (Wong and Leung, 2001).  
 
Studies on Chinese guanxi started from business writings in the West that advised foreign 
businessmen about the cultural factors that affect doing business in China (Alston, 1989). 
Later studies mainly focused on the comparison of the western concept of relationships and 
the Chinese concept of guanxi (Arias, 1998; Wong and Chan, 1999). Researchers identified 
several benefits of Chinese guanxi networks. Guanxi-based business transactions show 
transaction cost advantages (Standifird and Marshall, 2000), enhance competitive advantage 
(Thorelli, 1986), improve firms’ efficiency and growth (Luo and Chen, 1997), and facilitate 
long-term business success in China (Yeung and Tung, 1996).  
 
Researchers have studied guanxi in China from different perspectives, such as marketing and 
negotiation (Lee and Lo, 1988) and relationship marketing (Wong and Leung, 2001). 
However, little research has been directed to the Chinese agrifood sector (Cunningham, 
2001), and no systematic attempts have been made to investigate the impacts of personal 
relationships on market performance (Lu et al., 2008). Contract farming is not well developed 
in China, so few studies have focused on the mutual effects of personal relationships and 
contracts in the agrifood sector, nor their joint effects on market performance. This study is an 
attempt to bridge this gap using the Chinese vegetable market as an illustration. The objective 
of this paper is to explore how Chinese guanxi networks and contracts (jointly) affect market 
performance for vegetable farmers and firms. We hope it will provide insights into how to 
stimulate the further development of the Chinese vegetable sector in general, and enhance 
market performance for farmers and firms, in particular. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the research model on 
the interactions between guanxi networks, contractual governance, and market performance. 
Section 3 introduces the research design. The empirical results are presented in Section 4. 
Major conclusions are discussed in Section 5 and the paper ends with a discussion of 
managerial implications. 
 
2. Conceptual research model 
 
In this paper, we develop a conceptual research model to investigate the interactions between 
guanxi networks, contractual governance, and market performance. For a deeper 
understanding, we distinguish two levels of market performance. At the first level, we 
investigate the effects of guanxi networks and contractual governance on compliance with 
channel requirements in terms of quality standards and delivery conditions. At the second 
level, we investigate the effects on financial and non-financial performance (efficiency, 
satisfaction and profitability, see Figure 1). 
 
                                                 
1
 The word guanxi in Chinese refers to the social networks of personal relationships. It is composed of two 
Chinese characters, guan (gate) and xi (connection). One must pass the gate to get connected to the network 
(Wang, 2007). 
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Guanxi networks 
 
Guanxi is a cultural and social concept in China. The meaning and significance of guanxi in 
the social and business context are complicated (Wu, 1999). Guanxi is more than the 
exchange of gifts in order to procure favourable business transactions (Standifird and 
Marshall, 2000). The transferability of guanxi leads to a means to screen potential partners. 
The flexible and social nature of guanxi permits the members of a guanxi network to deal 
with unforeseen contingencies arising after agreements are reached. Thus guanxi possesses 
the capacity to reduce transaction costs associated with environmental uncertainties (i.e. 
communicating, negotiating and coordinating transactions) and behavioural uncertainties (i.e. 
opportunism) (Standifird and Marshall, 2000). A well-developed guanxi network in China can 
help farmers and firms carry out asset-specific value chain activities, which may substantially 
improve vegetable quality and farmers’ delivery capabilities. This facilitates quality and 
delivery requirements, which may eventually lead to good market performance (high level of 
efficiency, satisfaction and profitability) for farmers and firms (Lu, 2007). 
 
Guanxi in social life and business is useful for obtaining valuable information (such as 
demand and price information, buyer availability, etc.) via direct and/or indirect personal 
connections within the social networks. Theoretical literature suggests that building strong 
personal relations with the right person is crucial to attain long-term business success in China 
(Yeung and Tung, 1996). Empirical research on guanxi has shown significant effects on 
different outcome variables. Guanxi networks encourage trust-based exchanges (Hill, 1995) 
and moderate investment behavior (Batjargal and Liu, 2004). Both trust and investment are 
important factors in buyer-seller relationships, which may significantly contribute to market 
performance improvement for farmers and firms (Claro et al., 2003; Lu, 2007). Another study 
on Chinese guanxi also suggested a direct impact of guanxi networks on market performance, 
such as efficiency and growth (Luo and Chen, 1997).  
 
Contractual governance 
 
According to the logic of transaction cost economics, the manager’s task is to craft 
governance arrangements at minimal cost that ensure the delivery of the desired products. 
Therefore, the role of contracts in business relationships has clear managerial implications 
(Lusch and Brown, 1996). Contracts between farmers and their buyers imply specific 
transaction agreements whose terms include a specified price, quantity, quality and duration 
(Williamson, 1996). The more complex the contract, the greater the specification of promises, 
obligations and processes for dispute resolution. Long-term contracts are also explicitly 
drafted with a provision to promote the longevity of exchange (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). If 
the seller is not able to deliver the desired products to the buyers in accordance with their 
contracts, the buyer-seller relationships will be terminated. As information spreads quickly, 
farmers may not to be trusted by other members in a business network if they failed to fulfil 
their obligations to one of its members. Farmers may also lose transaction opportunities with 
other existing partners. Thus with a contractual arrangement, the farmers have more 
incentives and are more willing to comply with their buyers’ requirements in terms of product 
quality and delivery conditions.  
 
Formal contracts are mechanisms by which to reduce risk and uncertainty in exchange 
relationships (Lusch and Brown, 1996). Therefore, in the vegetable business, both farmers 
and firms will energetically discuss the content of the contracts in order to have better 
solutions for quality, quantity, price and delivery, etc. All these can be determined in advance 
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or during transactions. The more of these factors that are agreed upon by the farmers and their 
buyers beforehand, the less risk and uncertainty that will be for ongoing transactions; which, 
in turn, may contribute to the improvement of market performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure1. Conceptual research model. 
 
Interaction between and joint effects of guanxi networks and contractual governance 
 
Recently, researchers have become interested in the relationships between contractual and 
relational governance (Ferguson et al., 2005; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Yu et al., 2006). The 
main objective of such studies is to determine whether the two forms of governance function 
as complements or substitutes of each other.  
 
The complementarity view suggests that the joint use of formal and informal arrangements 
provides more efficient outcomes than the use of either arrangement in isolation. The major 
and most elaborate argument supporting the complementary view is based on the idea that 
(even incomplete) formal contracts can facilitate the self-enforcement of informal agreements. 
It was asserted that formal contracts can reduce the gains from short-term defection, thereby 
increasing the value of honouring informal dealings (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). The 
specification of contractual safeguards promotes expectations that the other party will behave 
cooperatively and thus complements the limits of informal relational governance (Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002). 
 
The substitution view suggested that formal rules take over the operation of social norms 
supporting informal dealings. Formal contracts damage the reciprocity norm embodied in 
informal agreements. The use of punishments as incentives can signal that no reciprocity is 
expected, thereby placing the relationship in a strictly economic, rather than social, 
framework (Fehr and Gachter, 2002). Such negative incentives may damage the quality of 
exchange outcomes by discouraging an individual’s voluntary willingness to cooperate, 
manifested through reciprocity norms (Lazzarini et al., 2004).  
 
Guanxi is widely recognised as the Chinese version of relational governance (Arias, 1998; 
Wong and Leung, 2001). Chinese society is currently confronted with new laws and 
regulations as well as its deeply rooted cultural “law” of guanxi. In some situations, guanxi 
can take precedence over legitimate decisions based on law or regulations (Braendle et al., 
2005). Guthrie (1998) studied guanxi as an institutionally defined system (i.e., a system that 
depends on the institutional structure of society rather than on culture). He concluded that 
guanxi plays a diminishing role in China and predicted that the legal system (formal 
governance) will take over the influence of guanxi in the economic transition. Schramm and 
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Taube (2003), however, observed recently that guanxi networks still prevail and co-exist with 
the legal system in China. They called for the study of the complementary effects of guanxi 
networks on formal governance.  
 
Compliance with quality and delivery requirements  
 
Quality requirements and delivery conditions tend to differ widely amongst different outlets 
in Chinese vegetable markets (Lu, 2007). The farmers can be successful only when they are 
able to deliver the right products at the right time to the right markets. The buyers, on the 
other hand, also have to buy the right products from the right market in order to achieve a 
good market performance. To satisfy the specific requirements regarding quality standards 
and delivery conditions of specific vegetable buyers, farmers have to upgrade their production 
system and improve their production practices. As we discussed earlier, both the guanxi 
networks and contractual governance can help the sellers and buyers to agree upon the 
delivery and quality specifications that in turn may improve their market performance. 
 
Compliance with buyers’ quality requirements and delivery conditions is also a critical 
consideration for the selection of preferred suppliers (Ruben et al., 2007b). Preferred suppliers 
are required primary in high-value market outlets (e.g. supermarkets and international 
markets) with high quality standards. Therefore, complying with channel requirements in 
terms of quality and delivery conditions is a prerequisite for building and maintaining long-
term and close buyer-seller relationships in high-value market outlets for farmers. 
 
Efficiency, satisfaction and profitability 
 
In a buyer-seller relationship, performance measurement and evaluation require special 
attention. Both financial and non-financial indicators are employed in literature on buyer-
seller relationships to measure performance. Previous studies use a variety of financial 
indicators (both subjective and objective), such as profitability (Mohr and Speckman, 1994) 
and efficiency (Luo and Chen, 1997) to measure performance. Subjective measures of non-
financial performance (such as satisfaction) have also been employed to measure performance 
(Claro et al., 2003). In this study, we therefore adopt both financial (efficiency and 
profitability) and non-financial (quality satisfaction) indicators to evaluate the market 
performance of farmers and firms. 
 
3. Research design 
 
Data collection 
 
In 2005, we collected data from a stratified random sample of 167 farmers and 84 firms from 
five counties with different socio-economic characteristics in Jiangsu Province, P.R. China. 
All data were collected based on face-to-face interviews (which have been approved to be the 
most efficient way to collect data in China (Lu, 2007)). Semi-structured questionnaires were 
designed. To optimise the validity of the questionnaires, valuable insights were obtained 
through a series of eight case studies (Lu et al., 2006), literature research and pre-test 
interviews. The respondents in case studies and pre-test interviews were asked to complete the 
questionnaire and give comments on the questions. This yielded useful suggestions to 
improve the content validity of the measurement instrument. Farmers with rich experience in 
vegetable production and marketing activities as well as high-level managers in the sampled 
firms (like CEOs) were interviewed in order to minimize response bias (Campbell, 1955). To 
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enhance translation equivalence, two social science researchers fluent in both languages used 
forward and backward translation techniques to translate the English questionnaires into 
Chinese (Mullen, 1995). 
 
Methods 
 
The measures were subjected to a purification process involving a series of reliability and 
validity assessments using SPSS (Field, 2005) and partial least squares (PLS). In the first step, 
exploratory factor analysis with varimax rotation was conducted to select the most related 
items for the following constructs: guanxi networks, contractual governance, compliance with 
quality and delivery requirements, efficiency, and satisfaction.  
 
In the second step, factor loading, composite reliability, average variance extracted, and item-
to-total correlation were obtained from the measurement and structural model to show the 
validity and reliability of each construct. PLS was chosen to evaluate errors in the construct 
measurements and hypothesised relations. Although PLS estimation has some shortcomings, 
such as the bias and inconsistency of loadings and inner structural coefficients (Fornell and 
Cha, 1994), the choice was motivated by several considerations. First, compared to the better 
known factor-based covariance fitting approach for latent structural modelling (e.g. LISREL), 
the component-based PLS avoids two problems: inadmissible solutions (e.g. negative 
variance) and factor indeterminacy (Fornell and Bookstein, 1982). Second, PLS requires only 
that the basic assumptions of least squares estimation are satisfied. Third, PLS can model both 
formative and reflective indicators simultaneously. PLS uses jackknife or bootstrap (Efron 
and Gong, 1983) in combination with the traditional measures of goodness-of-fit  to evaluate 
the model2. Following Chin (1998), bootstrapping with 500 resampling was used to show the 
precision of the PLS estimates. 
 
Measurements 
 
All the constructs, except profitability, were measured by multiple items in this study. The 
detailed items used to measure each construct are listed in Appendix 1. 
 
Guanxi networks imply how farmers and firms use their guanxi networks to achieve success 
in the vegetable business. As a kind of China-specific social capital, we focus on the support 
that guanxi networks provide for business transactions. Six items were used to measure the 
impact of guanxi networks for vegetable farmers and two items were used for firms 3, such as 
the extent to which guanxi networks provide support in finding new buyers, accessing 
markets and improving production technology. 
 
Contractual governance refers to the transaction arrangements in the vegetable business. 
Based on transaction cost economics, contractual transactions are made to minimise 
transaction costs under higher risks and uncertainties (Williamson, 1979). The present paper 
defines contractual governance based on the agreements made between the farmers and firms 
                                                 
2
 Jackknife and bootstrap are nonparametric approaches to estimate the precision of the PLS estimates (Chin, 
1998). The general approach is to delete n cases (jackknife approach) or resample with replacement from the 
original data set (bootstrap approach). Parameter estimates are calculated for each instance, and the variation in 
the estimates are analyzed. For more details about jackknife and bootstrap, see Efron and Gong (1983). 
3
 Originally we had the same items for both samples, but some of the items were filtered out during the 
exploratory factor analysis. 
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regarding price, quality, quantity, and delivery conditions. Statements regarding price and 
quality arrangement between sellers and buyers were used to measure this construct. 
 
Compliance with quality and delivery requirements refers to the farmers’ ability to comply 
with firms’ requirements regarding quality standards and delivery conditions. Three and two 
items were used to measure the constructs for farmer and firm sample respectively. To 
measure compliance with quality requirements, statements like: “Vegetable quality is 
important in this market” and “Green A (or AA) 4  quality standards is required for this 
market” were used. To measure compliance with delivery requirements, statements such as 
“Consistent delivery is important for this market”, “Accurate delivery time and place are 
important for this market”, and “Value added activities are required for this market” were 
used.  
 
Efficiency refers to the extent to which a transaction used resources appropriately and was 
completed the transaction in a timely manner. Resources can be time, effort and money. 
Transaction costs are closely related to the efficiency of the transactions. Both farmers and 
firms have to spend a lot of time searching for market information and finding good partners. 
Therefore, in this study, the items related to time and costs of vegetable transactions were 
used to measure efficiency. Three and two items were used to measure efficiency for farmer 
and firm sample respectively.  
 
Satisfaction was used to measure the perceived quality and the price received (for farmers) or 
paid (for firms) for vegetables. Firms are satisfied when the perceived vegetable quality is 
equal to or higher than what they expected. Firms are also satisfied when the price paid is 
equal to or lower than what they are expected to pay. Three and two items were used to 
measure efficiency for farmer and firm sample respectively.  
 
Profitability refers to the ability of the farmers and firms to generate net income from 
vegetable transactions. It is a commonly used financial indicator for performance 
measurement (Lusch and Brown, 1996). Due to the difficulties in collecting economic data 
related to profit from vegetable farmers (no data available) and firms (not willing to provide 
data for confidential reasons), we measured profitability using a single item of self-reported 
achievement of expected profitability. 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
Validity and reliability of measures and constructs 
 
Following common practice (Mathieson et al., 2001), we examined the inter-construct 
correlation, composite reliability and average variance extracted for each construct, for 
reliability and validity evaluation (see Table 1). 
 
Individual item reliability was determined by examining the loadings of measures on their 
corresponding constructs. In all cases loadings are greater than 0.6, indicating a high degree 
of item reliability (see Appendix 1). Internal consistency was assessed using a measure of 
composite reliability. A value of 0.7 or greater is reasonable for exploratory research 
                                                 
4
 Green A and AA are the two high level food quality standards in China. The basic food quality stands in China 
is called pollution free food. Green AA is equivalent to organic foods. The detailed information about Chinese 
food quality system please refer to Liu et al. (2004) 
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(Nunnally, 1988). In the current study, composite reliability for all constructs exceeded 0.75 
(see Table 1, italic column), indicating a good internal consistency of the constructs. 
 
The discriminant validity can be assessed in two ways. First, the square root of the average 
variance extracted (AVE) should be greater than all construct correlations, as is the case here 
(see Table 1). Second, all items load higher to their associated construct than to the other 
constructs. The results on both criteria indicated that the discriminant validity of the 
constructs used in this study is quite adequate.  
 
Table 1. Construct means, standard deviations (SD), composite reliability (CR), construct 
correlations and average variance extracted (AVE) for both samples. 
Farmer sample Mean SD CR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Guanxi networks 3.61 0.62 0.91 0.82       
2. Contractual 
governance 
3.82 0.72 0.92 0.24 0.86      
3. Compliance with 
quality requirements 
2.45 0.64 0.84 0.43 0.22 0.79     
4. Compliance with 
delivery requirements 
4.29 0.50 0.80 0.29 0.53 0.42 0.76    
5. Efficiency 4.23 0.76 0.91 0.29 0.33 0.11 0.27 0.88   
6. Quality/price 
satisfaction 
4.33 0.55 0.81 0.42 0.38 0.37 0.48 0.15 0.77  
7. Profitability* 4.44 0.65 1.00 0.15 0.22 0.11 0.22 0.12 0.48 1.00 
Buyer sample Mean S.D. CR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Guanxi networks 3.84 0.78 0.79 0.81       
2. Contractual 
governance 
3.87 0.74 0.92 0.24 0.79      
3. Compliance with 
quality requirements 
1.28 0.74 0.79 0.21 0.25 0.86     
4. Compliance with 
delivery requirements 
3.95 0.60 0.81 0.23 0.48 0.38 0.88    
5. Efficiency 4.17 0.76 0.94 0.31 0.21 0.12 0.27 0.94   
6. Quality/price 
satisfaction 
4.12 0.52 0.75 0.11 0.39 -0.15 0.26 0.15 0.77  
7. Profitability* 5.42 1.23 1.00 0.03 0.11 0.003 0.23 0.21 0.04 1.00 
*: Profitability was measured by 7-point Likert scale. 
Note: 1. Square root of AVE are listed at the diagonal of the matrices (Italic). 
2. In this correlation matrix, correlations (bold) with a value of at least 0.18 are 
significant at 5% level. 
 
Test of the conceptual model 
 
The results of the path analysis for farmer sample and buyer sample are provided in Table 2. 
The average variance explained (R2) for the overall model is 19% and 14% for farmer and 
firm sample respectively. PLS provides standardised path coefficients, so we can compare the 
direction and the magnitude of the impacts based on path coefficients. 
 
Effects of guanxi networks and contracts on compliance with channel requirements 
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The results suggest that guanxi networks and contracts are important drivers for farmers to 
increase the compliance with channel requirements. Contracts have a greater impact than 
guanxi networks for vegetable firms, But guan networks have direct and positive effects on 
farmers’ compliance with buyers’ quality and delivery requirements (Relationship 1 and 2 in 
Table 2, left column). This indicates that with the supports obtained from their guanxi 
networks, farmers are more willing to cope with buyer’s requirements and complete 
transactions based on the agreements. Contractual governance also has significant positive 
effects on farmers’ compliance with buyers’ delivery requirements (Relationship 5 in Table 2, 
left column). This implies that farmers are able to deliver products on time to buyers with a 
contract. For vegetable firms, guanxi networks do not appear to have significant effects on 
compliance with channel requirements (Relationship 1 and 2 in Table 2, right column), while 
contracts do (Relationship 4 and 5 in Table 2, right column). This indicates that vegetable 
firms’ guanxi networks do not significantly help them obtain good vegetables from suppliers. 
However, within a contractual relationship, their quality and delivery requirements will most 
likely be fulfilled by their vegetable suppliers. 
 
Table 2. Path model parameter estimates for the farmer (n=167) and firm (n=84) sample. 
PLS estimation 
Relationships 
Farmer sample Firm sample 
1. Guanxi networks  Compliance with quality 
requirements 
0.40 (0.06)** 0.16 (0.12) 
2. Guanxi networks  Compliance with delivery 
requirements  
0.18 (0.07)** 0.12 (0.09) 
3. Guanxi networks  Contractual governance 0.24 (0.07)** 0.24 (0.12) 
4. Contractual governance  Compliance with quality 
requirements  
0.12 (0.07) 0.21 (0.10)* 
5. Contractual governance  Compliance with delivery 
requirements 
0.49 (0.06)** 0.45 (0.10)** 
6. Compliance with quality requirements  Efficiency -0.08 (0.08) -0.02 (0.07) 
7. Compliance with quality requirements  Satisfaction 0.11 (0.06) -0.32 (0.12)* 
8. Compliance with quality requirements  Profitability -0.01 (0.05) -0.10 (0.09) 
9. Compliance with delivery requirements  Efficiency 0.11 (0.09) 0.19 (0.13) 
10. Compliance with delivery requirements  
Satisfaction 
0.28 (0.08)** 0.20(0.11) 
11. Compliance with delivery requirements  
Profitability 
0.13 (0.08) 0.27 (0.11)* 
12. Guanxi networks  Efficiency 0.23 (0.10)* 0.25 (0.12)* 
13. Guanxi networks  Satisfaction 0.26 (0.07)** 0.04 (0.07) 
14. Guanxi networks  Profitability 0.08 (0.07) -0.01 (0.08) 
15. Contractual governance  Efficiency 0.23 (0.09)** 0.06 (0.07) 
16. Contractual governance  Satisfaction 0.14 (0.07) 0.37 (0.09)** 
17. Contractual governance  Profitability 0.13 (0.08) 0.01 (0.08) 
Average R2 0.19 0.14 
Note: **: Path coefficients are significant at 1% level; *: Path coefficients are significant at 
5% level.  
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The results also show a positive significant relationship (in the farmer sample) between 
guanxi networks and contractual governance (Relationship 3 in table 2). This implies that 
farmers are more able to engage in contractual transactions when their guanxi networks can 
support them in the vegetable business. Since the contract is also the assurance for the 
longevity of business relationships, guanxi networks can in this way help farmers keep stable 
and long-term marketing relationships. Although the relationship between guanxi networks 
and contracts is not significant for the firm sample, both positive relations for farmer and firm 
samples indicate that guanxi networks and contracts are complement each other in the 
vegetable sector in China.  
 
Effects of compliance with channel requirements on market performance 
 
The results show that compliance with delivery requirements significantly improves farmers’ 
market performance in terms of satisfaction (Relationship 10 in table 2, left column) and 
firms’ market performance in terms of profitability (Relationship 11 in table 2, right column). 
This indicates that if the farmers are able to comply with their buyers’ delivery requirements, 
the farmers will build a good quality image among their buyers and get a good price. When 
firms’ delivery requirements can be fulfilled by the vegetable suppliers, on the other hand, the 
firms are more able to reach good profitability. Compliance with quality requirements, 
however, has a negative effect on satisfaction for the firm sample. The negative effect implies 
that the higher quality the firms requires, the less satisfaction that firm perceives. This may be 
because it is difficult for firms to buy qualified Green AA or organic vegetables from the 
markets and small-scale vegetable farmers are not able to guarantee high-quality production 
due to technical and economical constraints. 
 
Effects of guanxi networks and contractual governance on performance  
 
Path analyses also show the direct effects of guanxi networks and contractual governance on 
market performance. The results show that guanxi networks are positively related to 
efficiency for vegetable farmers and firms (Relationship 12 in Table 2). In a guanxi network, 
farmers and firms may significantly reduce the time and effort required search for market 
information and business opportunities, which may significantly increase efficiency. The 
results also reveal that farmers’ guanxi networks are positively associated with satisfaction 
(Relationship 13 in Table 2, left column). This means that with the support of their guanxi 
networks, farmers are more able to reach a satisfied buyer-seller relationship regarding 
perceived quality and price. However, guanxi networks do not directly contribute to 
profitability (Relationship 14 in Table 2). Building and maintaining a guanxi network is a 
costly activity; therefore, guanxi networks may not increase profit for farmers and firms.  
 
The results also demonstrate that contracts significantly improve efficiency for farmers 
(Relationship 15 in Table 2, left column) and increase satisfaction for firms (Relationship 16 
in Table 2, right column). This means that in contractual business relationships, it may cost 
farmers less time and money to deliver vegetables to buyers; and firms will be more satisfied 
with the quality of the products and pay a good price. 
 
5. Conclusions and discussions 
 
The empirical evidence presented here indicated that the farmers and their buyers may 
perceive the effects of buyer-seller relationships differently (Claro, 2004). This may also be 
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the case for the role of guanxi networks in vegetable business, since the farmer and firms hold 
different position and do not wield the same degree of power. Therefore, in this study, we 
tried to compare the different paths to market performance.  
 
Different paths to achieve market performance for farmers and firms 
 
By excluding the non-significant paths, we identify the relations focusing on the significant 
paths. We noticed that there are several similarities for the farmers’ and firms’ paths to 
achieving market performance. The most important path to performance involves contractual 
governance and compliance with delivery conditions. Both the farmer and firm samples 
indicated that contractual governance is key to complying with channel requirements and 
crucial to achieving superior performance.  
 
A significant distinction was also found between the farmers’ and the firms’ paths to 
achieving market performance. Farmers use the path that can be found in Figure 2 to achieve 
performance. 
 
The farmers rely on their guanxi networks to come in contact with their buyers and to access 
(new) markets. In a buyer-dominated market, farmers face severe difficulties in selling their 
products, such as poor market access, unavailable buyers and low prices. Thus, it is 
reasonable and important for them to rely on their personal guanxi networks to overcome such 
problems. In a contractual relationship, farmers are willing to comply with buyers’ delivery 
requirements, thereby improving their quality image and obtaining a good price. These results 
are consistent with the findings of earlier case studies (Lu et al., 2006). Quality is the 
powerful “brick” to knock on the “door” of markets. In order to access markets, vegetable 
farmers may have to rely on their guanxi networks and build up long-term buyer-seller 
relationships with improved delivery capacity to comply with buyers’ requirements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Farmers’ path to achieving good performance. 
 
Vegetable firms (such as processing and exporting companies), on the other hand, face few 
difficulties in buying high-quality vegetables from the suppliers. They therefore tend to rely 
less on their guanxi networks in purchasing vegetable, and thus follow a different path to 
achieve performance (see Figure 3).  
 
Under contractual arrangements, the firms can improve their market performance when their 
delivery requirements are fulfilled by their vegetable suppliers. Interestingly, guanxi networks 
did not play a significant role in this case. In the Chinese vegetable market, firms face fewer 
problems in acquiring good quality vegetables. The firms thus have strong negotiation power 
in markets and do not have to rely on their guanxi networks. 
 
Complementary effect of guanxi networks and formal contracts 
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Compliance 
with delivery 
requirements  
 
Performance 
12 
The structural model reveals that guanxi networks are positively related to formal contracts in 
both the farmer and firm samples. The positive relationship indicates a complementary effect 
of guanxi networks on formal contracts in China. This is consistent with previous studies on 
guanxi in China (Potter, 2002; Schramm and Taube, 2003). Guanxi, as historical and cultural 
phenomena, will prevail in Chinese business and co-existent with formal governance in the 
future. Therefore, combining formal (contracts) and informal (guanxi) governance 
mechanisms seems to be the best way to organise vegetable supply chains in China.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Firms’ path to achieving good performance. 
 
6. Managerial implications 
 
The vegetable sector in China is well known for its huge volume of production, the prominent 
role played by small-scale producers, and increasing international orientation. Achieving 
business success in long-term buyer-seller relationships is essential for both vegetable sellers 
and buyers. Based on this study, two managerial implications can be pointed out. 
 
First, guanxi networks play an important role in vegetable business. The results of this study 
suggest that sellers can increase their ability to comply with buyer’s delivery requirements by 
establishing and maintaining guanxi networks. Guanxi networks increase farmers’ access to 
markets and their opportunities to maintain long-term relationships. So it is important for the 
farmers to put more efforts into building guanxi networks to expand their markets and to 
improve their performance. 
 
Second, contract farming should play a predominant role in vegetable business in China. 
According to the logic of transaction cost economics, contractual governance effectively 
eliminates costs that ensure the delivery of the desired products. By engaging in contract 
farming, farmers have guaranteed demand; while buyers are assured of a consistent supply 
and determined quality. Long-term contracts promote long-term of exchange relationships, 
which offer a more secure future for small-scale vegetable farmers in China. 
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APPENDIX 1. Constructs and items used in the models for the farmer and firm 
samples. 
The farmer sample (N=167) The firm sample (N=84) 
Constructs Loading Constructs Loading 
Guanxi networks  Guanxi networks  
My guanxi network supports me to build trust 
with my input suppliers 
0.85 My guanxi network supports me to build 
trust with my suppliers 
0.62 
My guanxi network supports me to access to 
this market 
0.83 My guanxi network supports me to order 
through telephone with my suppliers 
0.97 
My guanxi network supports me to find new 
buyers in this market 
0.77   
My guanxi network supports me to build trust 
with my buyers 
0.78   
My guanxi network supports me to improve 
my production technology 
0.86   
Contractual governance  Contractual governance  
Price is pre-agreed with my buyers  0.87 Price is pre-agreed with my suppliers  0.78 
Quality is pre-agreed with my buyers 0.83 Quality is pre-agreed with my suppliers 0.67 
Volumes are pre-agreed with my buyers 0.91 Volumes are pre-agreed with my suppliers 0.83 
Delivery time and place are pre-agreed with 
my buyers  
0.82 Delivery time and place are pre-agreed with 
my suppliers  
0.87 
Compliance with quality requirements  Compliance with quality requirements  
Vegetable quality is important for this market 0.80 This supplier delivers vegetables in Green 
A quality standard 
0.89 
Green A quality standard is required for this 
market 
0.79 This supplier delivers vegetables in Green 
AA and organic quality standards 
0.84 
Green AA and organic quality standards are 
required for this market 
0.80   
Compliance with delivery requirements  Compliance with delivery requirements  
Consistent delivery is important for this 
market 
0.76 This supplier delivers consistent quality 
vegetables 
0.80 
Accurate delivery time and place are 
important for this market 
0.87 This supplier has accurate delivery time and 
delivery place 
0.95 
Value-added activities are required for this 
market 
0.64 
 
 
Efficiency   Efficiency  
It takes me less time to deliver vegetables to 
this market 
0.80 It costs us less when we purchase 
vegetables from this market 
0.91 
It takes me less time to sell vegetables in this 
market 
0.92 It takes us less time to finish an order in this 
market 
0.97 
It costs me less when I sell vegetables to this 
market 
0.93   
Satisfaction   Satisfaction   
My buyers are satisfied with the quality of my 
vegetables 
0.79 We are satisfied with the quality of the 
vegetables 
0.60 
I am happy with the price I get from my 
buyers  
0.87 We are happy with the price we pay to our 
suppliers 
0.91 
I get a good price for high quality vegetables 
from my buyers 
0.61 
 
 
Profitability  Profitability   
To what extent did you achieve the expected 
profitability with your vegetables selling to 
this market 
1.00 To what extent did you achieve the 
expected profitability with your vegetables 
purchasing from this market 
1.00 
Profitability is measured by 7-point Likert-scales, the others are measured by 5-point Likert-
scales (not true at all – totally true). 
